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Abstract 
 
 
There is growing regulatory pressure on firms worldwide to address the underrepresentation of 
women in senior positions. Regulators have taken a variety of approaches to the issue. We 
investigate a jurisdiction that has issued recommendations and disclosure requirements, rather than 
implementing quotas. Much of the rhetoric surrounding gender diversity centres on whether 
diversity has a financial impact. In this paper we take an aggregate (market-level) approach and 
compare the performance of portfolios of firms with gender diverse boards to those without. We 
also investigate whether having multiple women on the board is linked to performance, and if there 
is a within-industry effect. Overall, we do not find evidence of an association between diversity and 
performance. We find some weak evidence of a negative correlation between having multiple 
women on the board and performance, but that in some industries diversity is positively correlated 
with performance. 
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Introduction 
Board gender diversity has become a widely debated corporate governance topic over the last 
decade. Indeed, as reported below, some capital market regulators have moved to impose gender 
quotas on boards; whereas others have taken a more “best practice” approach and provided 
recommendations and/or disclosure requirements on firms with respect to their gender diversity 
profiles. We categorise these approaches to corporate governance and board composition as either 
“mandated” or “self-regulation”. At the core of the regulatory debate is the nature of the value to be 
created from diverse boards and the practical pressure it imposes on firms to respond to these 
corporate governance initiatives. 
Individual firms may face the cost of changing their board composition, or at least the cost of 
defending (disclosing) current practices. Academic literature from a variety of disciplines argues that 
an initiative such as board diversity is not solely an economic concern, but a matter that also may 
appeal to various social factors, recognising that firms participate not just in capital markets but in 
society as a whole (Hafsi and Turgut, 2013). However, the intriguing proposition that motivates the 
narrow focus in this study is the explicit statement from the Australian market operator that 
improving gender diversity enhances company performance – as an economic construct: 
 
“Research has shown that increased gender diversity on boards is associated with better 
financial performance, and that improved workforce participation at all levels positively 
impacts on the economy.” (ASX, 2010)i 
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Market operators, such as securities exchanges, routinely issue best practice corporate 
governance guidelines. In recent years, market operators and law makers have begun to try to 
address the clear under-representation of women in the upper echelons of the corporate  world. 
Particularly, for example, in Australia and the U.K., the market operators recommend that listed 
companies disclose and explain their chosen diversity policy and self-assessed performance (ASX, 
2010; FRC, 2012):ii a self-regulated approach. An increased regulatory focus on board gender 
diversity and improving the overall diversity of corporate boards indicates that policy-makers 
consider diversity at the board level important. However, a natural question that arises from the 
regulatory intervention is whether there is any measurable economic result. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the economic impact of board gender diversity 
initiatives promulgated by securities market operators, in a self-regulated environment. Prior 
literature on the economic impact of diversity tends to focus on individual firm effects. This study 
extends the literature by taking an overall or aggregate view of financial performance in the capital 
markets.  Specifically, we construct portfolios of firms with gender diverse boards and compare their 
returns over time to portfolios of firms with all-male boards. Our innovation is that we take a 
portfolio, or aggregate approach to measuring impact, not just a firm-level approach.  
Taking a portfolio approach also provides a substantial econometric improvement over firm-
level (panel) analysis. Corporate governance research is plagued by endogeneity, including issues 
caused by omitted variables, heterogeneity among samples and reverse causality. Forming portfolios 
means that firm-specific characteristics are averaged out, eliminating both the heterogeneity issue 
and also reducing the omitted variables problem – which arises because firm-specific characteristics 
(independent variables) impact firm-level outcomes (dependent variables). Further, presumably the 
market regulator is interested in the impact of regulation on overall market outcomes, and not on 
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specific firms. Using portfolios also has the advantage of more accurately reflecting how the new 
regulation will impact the overall market on average, rather than the impact on specific firms. 
The Australian capital market setting is ideal for this study as we are able to investigate the 
transition of a market from purely voluntary board composition decisions, through to more recent 
times in which the gender diversity recommendation has been incorporated into best practice 
guidelines. Although this became formal in 2010, there had been considerable interest in and 
leakage of the proposed regulation prior to this. The self-regulatory approach in Australia is relevant 
to other market jurisdictions, for example, the U.K that has adopted a disclosure approach, as well as 
those markets that remain unregulated on board gender diversity, such as in North America.  The 
alternative approach is to mandate quotas, and this approach has been taken in European countries 
such as France, Finland, Italy, Spain, Norway, and the Netherlands. There has been considerable 
research interest in these markets as to the economic benefits brought about by legislative mandate 
(Torchia et al., 2011; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The regulatory position can be a “moving target” of 
course: if the persuasiveness of the guidelines does not affect real change in Australian corporate 
boards, the Australian Discrimination Commissioner has signalled a move to mandatory quotas in 
2015 (AHRC, 2010).iii 
The descriptive statistics show the transition: in the years of voluntary adoption of board 
diversity (between 2004-2010), the percentage of sample companies with a diverse board hovered 
between 36 and 42 percent. In the year after self-regulation (2011), 52 percent of the sample 
companies reported a diverse board. One of the peak industry bodies, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors (AICD, 2012), reports that it is only since 2010 that women have been recruited 
to boards in relatively larger numbers.iv This move to self-regulation provides an ideal opportunity to 
investigate questions of director diversity. Until the start of this decade, there have been insufficient 
observations to perform research using statistical techniques. For this reason, we classify diversity as 
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boards with one female director, as opposed to none. Further discrimination is difficult given the 
data, but nevertheless we believe this analysis is extremely topical and timely.  
In terms of our results, we find no compelling evidence of a clear performance differential 
between firms with and without female directors. However, we suggest that there are plausible 
circumstances in which a firm that is larger, more established and in a particular industry may “trade 
up” to diversity as a business proposition, but not necessarily for clear-cut quantifiable economic 
reasons. 
Accordingly, we see the contribution of the research as focussing on a particular aspect of the 
regulatory debate: to measure the extent of the economic benefit, if any, to the market of the 
regulatory initiative. That the results do not show superior portfolio returns for diverse boards is still 
informative to the regulatory debate and the academic challenge to identify and measure the 
benefits and enhancements brought about by board diversity.  
 This paper proceeds as follows. The background and literature is reviewed and 
contextualised in section 2 and data described in section 3. We present the methodology in section 
4. Results and analysis are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes with insights to the 
regulatory impetus. 
 
Background and literature 
Regulatory background 
On 30 June 2010 the primary Australian market operator, the Australian Securities Exchange, 
announced the latest changes to its Corporate Governance principles (ASX, 2010) recommending: 
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“1. Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the policy or a 
summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to establish 
measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity (and) for the board to assess annually 
both the objectives and progress in achieving them. 
2. Companies should disclose in each annual report the measurable objectives for achieving 
gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress towards 
achieving them. 
3. Companies should disclose in each annual report the proportion of women employees in 
the whole organisation, women in senior executive positions and women on the board.” 
 
As an example, Figure 1 demonstrates how a large diversified firm listed on the ASX, 
Wesfarmers Ltd, has complied with the these three aspects of recommended disclosure. In its 2012 
annual report, the company reported its performance across measurable objectives (to foster an 
inclusive culture; improve talent management; enhance recruitment policies; and ensure pay equity) 
and numerical data on women employees, managers and directors.v 
The problem this corporate governance recommendation seeks to address is the under-
representation of women in corporate management – particularly at the senior, board, level. 
Australia is by no means alone in seeking to address the lack of female representation; indeed, other 
countries have implemented far more onerous requirements, for example: 
 France – women must hold 20% of board positions by 2014, and 40% by 2017 
 Italy – women must comprise 33% of board positions by 2015. Non-compliance will result 
in a fine of €1 million 
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 Finland – companies have been required to have at least one woman on the board since 
July 2010.  
As previously noted, the ASX’s stated motivation for implementing change to the corporate 
governance principles explicitly quotes enhanced company performance. This claim by the ASX is 
puzzling because a positive association between gender diversity and performance has not been 
convincingly established in the available academic literature. The alternative explanations are that 
firms will appoint women directors for other reasons – for example, the firm is already performing 
well and there is external pressure for diverse boards (Farrell and Hersch, 2005); or that “women 
may be being preferentially placed in leadership roles that are associated with an increased risk of 
negative consequence” (Ryan and Haslam, 2005, 83). Commentary from other disciplines argues a 
strong case for moral or social legitimacy – firms choose gender diverse boards for a variety of 
reasons and the “business case” is not solely an economic imperative (Carter et al., 2010; Fairfax, 
2011), but offers a signal of the firm’s commitment to its reputation and image to all stakeholders 
(consumers, employees, etc.), not just investors (Burke, 1997; Broome and Krawiec, 2008). Below, 
we summarise the academic literature on the impact of gender diversity on firm performance and 
similar types of constructs. 
 
Influence of female directors on firm performance 
Most corporate governance research into gender diversity that involves financial or market 
measures takes an agency theory approach (Terjesen et al., 2009). According to agency theory, the 
board of directors is the primary monitoring mechanism to curb management’s tendency to behave 
in a self-interest manner and not in the best interest of shareholders (Hart, 1995). Much research 
investigates the optimum size, composition and characteristics of the board, but it is accepted that 
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firms with dispersed ownership (as typically featured in market listed firms) should have boards that 
comprise a majority of independent directors. Certainly, despite any choices that firms may make on 
optimal board composition (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), many corporate governance codes now 
make a specific recommendation on board independence composition.   
 As to how women directors can positively influence firm performance under the 
expectations of agency theory, for example, whether female directors are “better” monitors, is a 
matter of much conjecture in the literature. Using agency theory as the perspective, gender should 
not matter to board tasks (Neilsen and Huse, 2010). The arguments can at most be indirect. Adams 
and Ferreira (2009, p. 292) suggest that “because they [female directors] do not belong to the ‘old 
boys club’, female directors could more closely correspond to the concept of the independent 
director emphasized in theory.” Other studies focus on decision-making tasks and suggest that 
female directors facilitate communication in decision-making (Bilimoria, 2000) or are more risk 
averse in business decisions (Srinidhi et al., 2011).  However, as Carter et al. (2003) point out, these 
differences may also mitigate effective monitoring if the “diverse” incumbents are marginalized on 
the board. As the literature we rely on is ambivalent in its expressed prior expectations, we do not 
hold a strong prior expectation. Rather, the question as to gender diversity and financial impact is 
motivated by the regulatory stance. More direct prior evidence on gender diversity and financial 
performance, predominantly based on firm-level analysis, is presented below. 
 
 Relation between gender diversity and firm performance.  
Evidence of a direct association between a firm’s financial performance and its board’s diversity 
profile remains elusive. As Adams and Ferreira (2009, p. 305) assert: “The literature on diversity also 
has ambiguous predictions for the effect of diversity on performance.”  
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A number of recent studiesvi that have investigated the question empirically have not found 
consistent results. Carter et al. (2010) do not find a significant relation between firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q and ROA) and diverse boards, using a sample of U.S. firms from the S&P 500 index for the 
period 1998 to 2002. Conversely, Carter et al. (2003), using a similar sample (Fortune 1000 firms in 
1997), find a positive relation between performance (Tobin’s Q) and diverse boards.vii In a broader 
sample (S&P 1500, 1996 to 2003), Adams and Ferreira (2009) find some evidence of a negative 
relation between gender diversity and company performance, measured as both the ratio of the 
firm’s market-to-book value (as a proxy for Tobin’s Q) and ROA.  
The studies to date using Australian data are highly constrained by sample size. Bonn (2004) 
found a positive relation between diversity and market-to-book ratio in a sample drawn from top 
companies in 1999. In a sample of firms with diverse boards in 2000–2001, diversity was associated 
with a higher Tobin’s Q (Nguyen and Faff, 2007). Wang and Clift (2009) discuss an absence of any 
statistically significant association between returns and the percentage of women on boards, with 
diversity data for only one year (2003) for the top 500 listed companies, and using ROA, ROE and 
shareholder return as performance measures.viii  
We note that these studies all were undertaken prior to the ASX’s diversity disclosure requirements 
and therefore have extremely few firms with women directors. The change in regulation and 
consequent increase in female director participation justifies a re-examination of the Australian 
market. Adams et al. (2011) examine director appointments and find that the stock market reacts 
more favourably to the appointment of women directors than men directors. 
We take a slightly different approach from that used by the current literature. Rather than 
examining diversity at the firm level, we examine the aggregate returns generated by portfolios of 
firms with diverse boards and compare these both to non-diverse boards (all- male boards), as well 
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as boards with varying degrees of diversity (one woman director on the board, or more than one 
woman director), and within industry. Taking a higher level, aggregate, approach is appropriate 
because we are particularly interested in the market regulator’s (high level) perspective. Essentially, 
we are investigating whether there is an association between gender diversity and overall market 
outcomes, not just on specific firm outcomes.  
 
Degrees of gender diversity  
A gender diverse board has been simply defined as a board with at least one female director (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Mınguez-Vera, 2008), as this is the easiest proxy to apply, 
especially given the lack of data (number of firms with women directors) available. However, there is 
a second order research question: how diverse does a diverse board have to be for there to be an 
economic impact? This has been referred to as “critical mass” (Broome et al., 2011), meaning that if 
there are enough women on a particular board, women are no longer different from other board 
members: the critical mass of the women directors no longer makes them “outsiders”. When applied 
to corporate boards, prior research suggests that the critical mass for women directors on a board is 
three or more (Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). Note, however, that the latter study was 
conducted in Norway where there has been a female director quota in place since 2005, hence 
enough variation in board composition data are available to discriminate this measure. In our study, 
due to the very low level of female board participation in Australia, such variation in board 
composition is not observable. We therefore choose to discriminate portfolios as either no women 
directors, or at least one female director (diversity); then, if there is diversity, whether there is one 
female director or more than one female director.  
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Board diversity and other firm level economic enhancement  
A “business case” for diversity can be approached by investigating other associations, typically at the 
firm level. Studies in accounting examine financial outcomes such as earnings quality (Krishnan and 
Parsons, 2008), earnings management (Srinidhi et al., 2011) and analyst forecast accuracy (Gul et al., 
2011) as a function of diverse boards and/or management. There are studies examining more direct 
economic impact such as board diversity and cost of capital (Gul et al., 2009). Finally, some research 
focuses on gender diversity effectiveness on board performance, in the sense of board oversight and 
monitoring (Hillman et al., 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).  
This study examines a business case for the market regulator – what does the capital market 
gain from increased gender diversity on corporate boards? The aim of our paper is to determine 
whether there is, in fact, any association between financial performance and gender diversity, by 
taking a market level perspective. Specifically we look at whether having women on a company’s 
board is correlated with any performance advantage or disadvantage. Of course, it could well be that 
the regulatory imperative is not about economic performance but another outcome – for example, 
social legitimacy (companies need to conform to society’s rules, norms, etc.). 
 
Data  
Our initial sample comprises all firms listed on the S&P/ASX 300 which broadly represents the largest 
300 listed Australian companies. Each month, we extract the constituent list of S&P/ASX 300 firms 
from Datastream – this allows us to track additions and deletions to the index over our sample 
period. We extract returns, book-to-market and market values of all stocks listed on the S&P/ASX 
300 from Datastream.  
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We obtain data on companies’ board members from the Boardroom database from Connect4. 
We verify the Connect4 start and end dates of female board members by checking company 
announcements on the ASX website.ix We match our S&P/ASX 300 list of firms against the available 
board member information from Connect4, which gives us a final sample of 577 firms over our 
sample period. As Connect4 data are only available from 2004 onwards, our sample period is 
January 2004 to September 2011. We use the return on the S&P/ASX 300 as a proxy for the return 
on the market and extract these data from Datastream. The risk-free rate is proxied by the 90-day 
bank accepted bill rate from the Reserve Bank of Australia.x 
 
Methodology 
Portfolio formation 
As mentioned above, we investigate the economic impact of gender diversity in a number of ways. 
We begin by splitting our sample into two groups: firms with all-male boards and firms with at least 
one woman on their board. We form portfolios of these two groups, as represented in Figure 2. We 
also form a difference portfolio (the long/short portfolio), which is long in the firms with women and 
short in the firms with only men on the board. This is to allow us to clearly determine whether there 
is a difference in the performance of firms with gender diverse boards and those without. We form 
both value-weighted and equally-weighted portfolios. As already mentioned, we choose to take a 
portfolio approach because we are interested in the market-level impact of gender diversity. 
However, forming portfolios also has the added advantage of diversifying firm-specific risk and 
improving the precision of estimates from regression analysis. 
 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
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We next investigate whether having more than one woman is associated with differential 
performance. We consequently split our female portfolio in two depending upon whether there is 
one woman or more than one woman on the board, also represented in Figure 2.xi We again 
compare our portfolio of one woman (more than one woman) to the portfolio of only men by 
forming a difference portfolio. We also compare whether there is a difference in the returns of the 
two female portfolios i.e. we create a difference portfolio between the one-woman and more-than-
one-woman portfolios. 
Finally, prior research (for example, Brammer et al., 2007) has identified that women may be 
more value-relevant in some industries than others.xii We investigate this proposition by forming 
portfolios comparing firms with only men on the boards to firms that have at least one female board 
member within industry using the ten Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry 
classifications. 
 
Empirical framework 
Our aim is to determine whether gender diversity is associated with financial performance. 
We use a number of widely accepted performance models to address this question. First, we use a 
one-factor model as follows:  
 
p ,t f ,t p p m,t f ,t p ,tR R ( R R )α β ε− = + − +      (1) 
where tpR , , tmR , , ,f tR  are the returns on portfolio p, the market portfolio, and the risk-free asset in 
month t, respectively.  
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A significantly positive (negative) alpha on our long/short portfolios will indicate that gender 
diversity is correlated with an increase (decrease) in risk-adjusted performance. 
It is possible firms that choose to have women on their boards may differ from those that do 
not in terms of their size, book-to-market ratios and momentum exposures. Specifically, larger firms 
may be more likely to hire women as they may face external pressure to behave in a socially 
acceptable way (Farrell and Hersch, 2005), and have the resources to do so. As these factors have 
been shown to impact returns, it is important that we control for them when investigating our 
portfolios. Consequently, we also perform the analysis using a four-factor model: 
 
p ,t f ,t p p m,t f ,t p p p p ,tR R ( R R ) s SMB h HML u UMDα β ε− = + − + + + +   (2) 
where tpR , , tmR , , tfR ,  are as above and SMB, HML and UMD are the monthly return on the 
mimicking size, book-to-market and momentum factors. 
 
We form size (SMB), book-to-market (HML) and momentum (UMD) factors in line with Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997). However, due to differences in the Australian and U.S. tax 
systems, portfolios are formed in December of year t-1, rather than in June, and held for 12 months 
(see also Gharghori et al., 2009). Each December, stocks are ranked on their market value and 
classified as small or big depending upon whether their market value is smaller or larger than the 
median market value. Independently, stocks are ranked on their book-to-market ratio and classified 
as either value, growth or neutral, with breakpoints at the thirtieth and seventieth percentile. Stocks 
with negative book values are deleted. SMB is then calculated as the value-weighted average return 
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on the small portfolios (small value, small neutral and small growth) minus the value-weighted 
average return of the big portfolios (big value, big neutral and big growth). Similarly, HML is the 
average return of the high book-to-market portfolios (big high and small high) minus the average 
return of the low book-to-market portfolios (big low and small low). UMD is formed in a similar way. 
At the end of December of year t-1, stocks are ranked on their prior one-year return and classified as 
up or down, using the thirtieth and seventieth percentile breakpoints. We use the same size 
classifications as before. UMD is calculated as the average return of the up portfolios (small up and 
big up) minus the average return of the down portfolios (small down and big down). 
 
Results and analysis 
As a useful snapshot of the gender diversity profile of the boards of firms listed on the Australian 
capital market, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Over the eight-year duration of the sample 
representing the S&P/ASX 300, there was an average of 287 firms (max 294; min 282). Panel A shows 
that the percentage of the sample with at least one female director fluctuates between 36% to 46% 
and peaks in the last year, 2011, at 52%. 
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
We are also interested in whether diversity can be differentiated beyond a point of one 
female director, and the data show that firms with two female directors fluctuate around 10% of the 
sample (except for 2011 where the level is 17%). The sample thins considerably beyond more than 
two female directors.  
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In Panel B we report the raw returns on our initial portfolios of all-male boards, boards with at 
least one woman, and the market factors. The table shows that on an equally-weighted basis, the 
female portfolio underperforms, but the means of the value-weighted returns are similar. However, 
neither of these differences are statistically significant: the p values on the paired t-tests between 
means (and Wilcoxon text between medians) are all above 0.30 for both the equally-weighted and 
the value-weighted portfolios. 
Panel C shows the industry breakdown of the sample. It is clear from the panel that boards 
with at least one female director are concentrated in particular industries. The majority of firms in 
consumer services, financials and telecommunications have at least one woman on their boards. 
However, firms in basic materials are clearly dominated by all-male boards. It must be noted that 
some industries, particularly telecommunications, utilities, and technology comprise very few firms. 
These small sample sizes need to be considered when we interpret results from portfolios formed 
within these industries. 
Table 2 presents regression results from portfolios of firms with all-male boards compared to 
firms with at least one female board member. We are mainly interested in the long/short portfolio 
results because these indicate whether there are significant differences between the portfolios. The 
alphas on the long/short portfolios are insignificant, meaning there is in fact no correlation between 
having women on a firm’s board and returns. This result is upheld regardless of whether we use the 
one- or four-factor model or whether we value-weight or equally-weight the portfolios. 
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
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The long/short portfolios’ coefficients on the market factor are significantly negative, which 
suggests that firms that hire women tend to be of lower risk. We could perhaps argue that perhaps 
the types of firms that hire women are older, more established firms. In terms of loadings onto the 
four factors, we see a significant negative loading on the SMB factor for the long/short portfolios. 
This indicates it is larger firms that tend to have women on their boards. Perhaps this is to be 
expected: larger firms are more likely to face external scrutiny and therefore feel pressurised to take 
socially acceptable actions. Further, these firms are likely to have the resources to do so. The HML 
factor is significantly positive in the value-weighted portfolios. This demonstrates that firms with 
women on boards tend to be “value” firms. We could argue that value firms are more established 
firms that again may be expected to be able to afford diversity. Coefficients on UMD are 
insignificant: having women on boards does not appear to be related to prior stock performance.xiii  
 
Does having many women matter? 
In Table 3 we divide our female portfolio into firms with one woman versus those with more than 
one woman on the board. In terms of differences between all-male boards and boards with women, 
we again do not find any significant alphas: there is no difference in the performance of boards that 
have or do not have women. However, we are interested in whether there is a relationship between 
having one or more than one woman on the board and returns. We find weak evidence in our four-
factor value-weighted results that firms with more than one woman have lower returns than firms 
with one woman on the board. However, we note that this finding is only significant at the 10% level 
and is not consistent across all our tests. Our other long/short portfolios do not display a significant 
difference in the returns of firms with one versus more than one woman on the board. 
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Firms with more than one woman on the board are larger and tend to have more of a value 
tilt than firms with only one woman on the board. This may again indicate that firms that are more 
established are able to appoint more women to their boards than other firms. The betas on the two 
portfolios are not significantly different.xiv 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
Does industry matter? 
We investigate whether there is a correlation between gender diverse boards and returns across 
different industries because prior research has identified that having female board members is more 
valuable in some industries than in others (see Brammer et al., 2007). Results are in Table 4. For 
brevity, we present only results from the four-factor model using value-weighted portfolios.xv  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Focusing on the long/short portfolios, we see weakly significantly positive alphas on basic 
materials and consumer goods. It seems that in these two industries having at least one woman on 
the board is associated with higher returns.xvi However, for all eight other industries, we do not find 
any correlation between having gender diverse boards and returns: all the other alphas on the 
long/short portfolios are insignificant. 
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The long/short portfolios’ coefficients on the size factor are uniformly negative, albeit not 
always significant.
xviii
xvii This again highlights the fact that the larger firms appoint women to their 
boards. Long/short portfolios’ loadings onto the other factors (market, book-to-market and 
momentum) are not as homogenous, with some positive and some negative.  
Caution needs to be exercised when interpreting some of the industry results, however. A 
number of the industries comprise very few firms, and dividing firms further into those with and 
without women board members can drastically reduce the number of firms in each portfolio. This is 
particularly true of technology and telecommunications, where there are some months with no 
observations in either the female or the all-male portfolio. Results from basic materials, financials, 
industrials and consumer services are robust, however, as these portfolios comprise at least ten 
firms in any given month.xix 
 
Robustness tests 
In our main analysis, we form portfolios of firms with and without women, as we believe this  
methodology best demonstrates whether gender diversity provides higher returns at the 
aggregate, market-level – as suggested by the market regulator. This approach is perhaps 
unusual in the corporate governance literature and therefore for robustness we also perform 
the analysis in a panel setting.xx In this case, we need firm-specific variables which are only 
available on an annual basis.  
We perform the  analysis in two ways. First, we follow Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and 
regress industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q against the proportion of women on the board as the only 
independent variable, as well as time and period fixed effects. We also investigate return on 
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assets as the dependent variable. Results (not displayed, available upon request) show that in 
each case, the coefficient on the proportion of women is insignificant.  
 We next perform an analysis similar to Adams and Ferreira (2009)  and regress the log of 
Tobin’s Q against: proportion of women, board size, log revenue and the proportion of non-
executive directors. We follow those authors and perform the regression in three ways: OLS, firm 
fixed effects and then use an Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel model (i.e. including a lag of 
log Tobin’s Q). Our results (not displayed, available upon request)  are similar to Adams and Ferreira 
(2009): the coefficient on the proportion of women variable is insignificantly positive using OLS, but 
significantly negative using firm fixed effects and using a dynamic panel model. As discussed in 
Adams and Ferreira (2009), these disparities in results highlight the necessity of correct model 
specification that allows for potential endogeneity.  We also use return on assets as the dependent 
variable and in this case the coefficient on the proportion of women is insignificant in all 
specifications. 
 We conclude, then, that our robustness tests overall uphold our main results: we do not find 
a relation between having one or more women on the board and performance.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The global regulatory interest in board gender diversity as a corporate governance best practice 
guideline has escalated over the last few years. Regulatory interest can manifest as mandatory board 
quotas (for example, Norway), to recommend and disclose regimes (for example, Australia and the 
U.K.) to regulators who lag global practice (for example, Canada and the U.S. which are as yet to 
address the issue). This provides a range of environments for researchers to study whether there is 
an association between diversity initiatives and firm value or outcomes. Most of the market-based 
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research referred to herein emanates from either the mandatory environment (Norway) or the 
unregulated environment (U.S.). There is literature from other disciplines that uses other evidence, 
such as surveys and interviews, to examine the firm level impacts of diverse boards. 
This study is set in the Australian market because it has recently introduced a “soft” regulatory 
approach – a recommendation that listed firms establish a gender diversity policy and disclose their 
performance and achievements against their adopted policy. Hence, the environment is not 
mandatory, but creates strong external pressure to conform. Second, rather perplexingly, the 
Australian market operator has motivated its stance by claiming the “business case” – that diversity 
is linked to performance. However, despite several studies investigating this problem, a conclusive 
link between firm performance and gender diversity has not been established. 
 We use a different methodology from prior literature and take a portfolio approach to the 
question. This aggregate approach more appropriately reflects the high-level view relevant to the 
regulator. One shortcoming of our study is one common to many studies reported herein – the 
extremely small proportion of women on Australian boards and, consequently, the low number of 
firms with female board members available. We have been able to ameliorate this constraint to 
some extent by using a portfolio approach. However, to investigate the degree of diversity, we are 
only able to discriminate between diversity meaning one female director, compared to diversity 
being more than one female director. The descriptive data show that the percentage of boards with 
two female directors is around 10% for most of our sample period, but beyond that point (three or 
more women) the sample thins considerably. This constraint may weaken our ability to detect 
whether gender diversity truly has a financial impact (it could be that larger numbers of female 
directors on boards are necessary for real “change”), but perhaps demonstrates why the  market 
regulator has chosen to intervene in this area. 
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 There are several industry reports that narrate the raw data on board composition in the 
Australian capital market. We are able to confirm that the percentage of diverse boards (at least one 
female director) in the top 300 firms fluctuates around 36–46% and peaks in 2011 (the first year 
after the corporate governance regulation) at 52%. As expected, there are industry clusters, but the 
industry clusters may be hard to predict.xxi We find the majority of diverse boards in the top 300 
firms are in the consumer services, financials and telecommunications industries.  
Overall, we do not find a strong business case for gender diversity on boards. Regardless of 
whether we use a one- or four-factor model, we find no difference in the performance of gender 
diverse and all-male board portfolios. However, we find weak evidence (significant in one of our 
models only) that more than one woman on a board is associated with lower returns. The absence of 
strong return results is informative to the market operator; it confirms that it is difficult to find 
evidence of an economic argument for diversity using market data. 
However, the study also contributes in terms of empirical evidence to support other value 
relevant propositions about diverse boards: we find larger firms with lower risk tend to have diverse 
boards, and it is the very large firms that are able to have more than one female director. This 
suggests that firms that are established can “afford” diverse boards. Further, there is weak evidence 
that having at least one female director is correlated with higher returns for the basic materials and 
consumer goods industries.  
Our findings suggest that in a non-mandated environment, evidence of a link between diverse 
boards and financial returns is elusive. A diverse board may be one corporate governance 
mechanism that a firm can “trade up” to for a range of complex societal reasons or stakeholder 
expectations, but neither firms nor the regulator should expect diversity to be associated with 
increased stock returns. Of course, this study has cited a selection of studies from a variety of 
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disciplines and it may well be that gender diversity is not solely a “business case” but a “buy-in” for a 
range of reasons. The nature of these alternative motivations for gender diverse boards is an 
interesting empirical question that we leave to future research. Given the potential suite of non-
financial motives, we would predict that the absence of market evidence would not preclude a move 
to a more mandated approach to the appointment of women to corporate boards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
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Figure 1 
This figure presents an example of how one firm, Wesfarmers Limited, has chosen to comply with the 
Australian regulator’s disclosure requirements on gender diversity. The table is extracted from Wesfarmers’ 
2012 Annual Report. 
 
ASX Principle Format of disclosure 
Diversity policy 
While Wesfarmers is committed to fostering all types of diversity, gender diversity has and 
continues to be a priority for the Group. As set out in the Wesfarmers Diversity Policy, the 
Group’s approach to gender diversity is based on four core objectives: foster an inclusive culture; 
improve talent management; enhance recruitment practices; and ensure pay equity. 
Measurable 
objectives 
• Foster an inclusive culture – Wesfarmers divisions undertake different initiatives and practices 
based on the needs of their business, such as flexible work practices at senior levels and paid 
parental leave. Specific targets are linked to senior executive key performance objectives under the 
annual incentive plan. 
• Improve talent management – at least once a year, the Group Managing Director meets with each 
division to review: senior leader performance and development; succession plans for critical roles; 
and the pipeline of high-potential leaders. 
During the 2012 financial year, talent reviews were conducted with all divisions for senior manager 
level staff and above and included 138 women. 
This is in addition to detailed talent reviews conducted with employees by individual businesses 
within the Wesfarmers Group. Throughout the Group, all high potential leaders benefit from an 
array of development opportunities such as internal and external development programs, stretch 
assignments, action learning projects, coaching, mentoring and 360-degree feedback. 
• Enhance recruitment practices – in 2012, 37 per cent of externally recruited positions and 30 per 
cent of internal promotions (all manager level and above roles) were filled by women. 
• Ensure pay equity – a pay audit is conducted annually on a Group basis (which includes a review 
of gender equity). Results are reviewed by the Board and divisional Managing Directors. In 
addition, a pay equity review of all Wesfarmers divisions was undertaken during the year, in line 
with previous years, which did not indicate any observable discrepancies in pay across each level, 
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after taking into account performance, experience, location and job nature.  
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Figure 1 continued 
 
 
 
Proportion of women 
employees, management, 
directors 
Percentage of 
female employees 
30 June 2011 30 June 2012 
Non-executive directors 25% 25% 
Senior executive positions 
(general manager or above) 
22% 21% 
All management 
and professional roles 
26% 
28% 
 
Total workforce 57% 57% 
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Figure 2 
This figure illustrates the way in which we divide our sample into the various portfolios. Each circle 
represents a portfolio that is comprised of companies with the stated gender profile.  
 
  
At least 
one 
woman 
One 
woman 
More than 
one 
woman 
At least 
one 
woman by 
industry 
All men 
All men 
by 
industry 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A 
This panel provides descriptive statistics on the firms in our sample. Figures are as of 30 June in each 
year. 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of firms 282 283 285 285 289 289 294 288 
Firms with at least one woman 102 113 128 130 129 115 124 149 
(percent of total) 36% 40% 45% 46% 45% 40% 42% 52% 
Firms with: 
        one woman 78 85 98 103 100 89 90 92 
two women 23 27 26 22 24 21 31 49 
three women 1 0 4 5 5 4 2 7 
four women 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
five women 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Panel B 
This panel provides descriptive statistics on returns. Female denotes portfolios of firms with at least 
one woman on the board, All male are portfolios of firms with no women on the board. Market, 
SMB, HML and UMD denote the return on the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factor 
respectively. Figures are per month. The sample period is January 2004 to September 2011. 
 Equally weighted Value weighted     
 
Female  All male  Female All male  Market SMB HML UMD 
 Mean 0.0056 0.0076 0.0068 0.0066 0.0029 -0.0003 0.0029 0.0005 
 Median 0.0152 0.0175 0.0150 0.0217 0.0138 -0.0045 0.0076 -0.0004 
 Maximum 0.1234 0.2136 0.0769 0.0862 0.0733 0.0988 0.1405 0.1019 
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 Minimum -0.2071 -0.2955 -0.0994 -0.2434 -0.1294 -0.1383 -0.1089 -0.0829 
 Std. Dev. 0.0499 0.0700 0.0372 0.0567 0.0406 0.0326 0.0394 0.0354 
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Panel C 
This panel provides descriptive statistics on the industry composition of the firms in our sample. 
Female denotes firms that have at least one female board member, All male denotes firms with no 
female board members. 
  Equally weighted  Value weighted 
 All male Female All male Female 
Basic materials 50.05 18.91 49.78 18.65 
Consumer goods 11.09 6.52 11.24 6.48 
Consumer services 10.07 23.01 10.10 22.96 
Financials 24.26 35.41 24.57 35.39 
Healthcare 9.62 6.24 9.68 6.23 
Industrials 30.55 16.93 30.73 16.76 
Oil & gas 15.92 6.62 16.02 6.46 
Technology 5.39 4.01 5.48 4.01 
Telecommunications 1.45 2.36 1.44 2.34 
Utilities 4.61 4.00 4.67 3.96 
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Table 2 
Returns on all firms 
This table provides results for portfolios formed from our full sample of firms. Female denotes 
portfolios of firms with at least one female board member, All male denotes portfolios of firms with 
no female board members, Long/short is a portfolio long in Female and short in Male. Alpha is the 
alpha coefficient from the regression model. Market, SMB, HML and UMD are the market, size, 
book-to-market and momentum factors, respectively. Newey-West HAC adjusted t statistics are in 
parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to September 2011. ***,**,* denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Alpha Market SMB HML UMD Adj R2 
One-factor model 
 
Female 0.003 1.15*** 
   
0.87 
  
(1.57) (20.08) 
    Equally weighted All male 0.006 1.53*** 
   
0.78 
  
(1.29) (12.06) 
    
 
Long/short -0.003 -0.38*** 
   
0.25 
  
(-0.72) (-4.61) 
    
 
Female 0.004*** 0.90*** 
   
0.98 
  
(7.10) (53.50) 
    Value weighted All male 0.004* 1.26*** 
   
0.81 
  
(1.73) (11.70) 
    
 
Long/short 0.000 -0.35*** 
   
0.20 
  
(-0.14) (-2.89) 
    Four-factor model 
 
Female 0.002* 1.01*** 0.36*** 0.23*** -0.07* 0.94 
  
(1.86) (37.58) (5.74) (6.77) (-1.82) 
 Equally weighted All male 0.005** 1.23*** 0.93*** 0.13** -0.08 0.95 
  
(3.12) (22.94) (16.41) (2.27) (-1.41) 
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Long/short -0.003 -0.22*** -0.56*** 0.10 0.01 0.58 
  
(-1.30) (-4.30) (-6.81) (1.18) (0.12) 
 
 
Female 0.004** 0.92*** -0.05** 0.01 0 0.98 
  
(7.06) (56.52) (-2.03) (0.86) (-0.15) 
 Value weighted All male 0.005** 1.16*** 0.37*** -0.23*** -0.06 0.88 
  
(2.79) (17.85) (4.53) (-3.84) (-1.02) 
 
 
Long/short -0.001 -0.24*** -0.42*** 0.24*** 0.06 0.47 
  
(-0.48) (-3.04) (-4.21) (3.42) (0.82) 
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Table 3 
Returns on firms with differing number of women 
This table provides results for portfolios formed from our full sample of firms. One denotes 
portfolios of firms with one female board member, Many denotes portfolios of firms with more than 
one female board member, All male denotes portfolios of firms with no female board members. 
Alpha is the alpha coefficient from the regression model. Market, SMB, HML and UMD are the 
market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors, respectively. Newey-West HAC adjusted t 
statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to September 2011. . ***,**,* 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
One-factor model 
  
Alpha Market SMB HML UMD Adj R2 
 One 0.003 1.19*** 
   
0.86 
 
 
(1.45) (16.62) 
     Many 0.0031 1.01*** 
   
0.72 
  
(1.25) (12.54) 
    Equally weighted One - many -0.0001 0.17 
   
0.06 
  
(-0.06) (1.57) 
    One - all male -0.0025 -0.34*** 
   
0.23 
 
 
(-0.76) (-4.82) 
     Many - all male -0.0024 -0.51*** 
   
0.22 
 
 
(-0.49) (-3.47) 
     One 0.0053*** 0.98*** 
   
0.91 
 
 
(4.35) (24.83) 
     Many 0.0016 0.81*** 
   
0.75 
  
(0.85) (10.75) 
    Value weighted One - many 0.0037 0.17 
   
0.04 
  
(1.26) (1.50) 
    
 
One - all male 0.0012 -0.28*** 
   
0.17 
  
(0.52) (-3.23) 
    
 
Many - all male -0.0025 -0.45** 
   
0.17 
  
(-0.62) (-2.51) 
    Four-factor model 
 
One 0.0024* 1.04*** 0.43*** 0.17*** -0.05 0.94 
  
(1.85) (27.86) (5.96) (4.11) (-1.29) 
 
 
Many 0.002 0.92*** 0.14** 0.39*** -0.13* 0.82 
  
(0.83) (17.26) (2.22) (7.45) (-1.83) 
 Equally weighted One - many 0.0004 0.12 0.29*** -0.22*** 0.08 0.30 
  
(0.17) (1.61) (4.07) (-3.21) (1.17) 
 
 
One - all male -0.0026 -0.19*** -0.49*** 0.04 0.03 0.52 
  
(-1.22) (-4.14) (-5.64) (0.49) (0.47) 
 
 
Many - all male -0.003 -0.31*** -0.78*** 0.26*** -0.05 0.59 
  
(-0.94) (-3.41) (-8.86) (2.92) (-0.61) 
 
 
One 0.0055*** 0.98*** 0.06 -0.09** 0.08* 0.92 
  
(4.88) (26.36) (1.40) (-2.34) (1.72) 
 
 
Many 0.0012 0.83*** -0.15*** 0.16** -0.09* 0.79 
  
(0.70) (14.16) (-3.17) (2.04) (-1.79) 
 Value weighted One - many 0.0044* 0.16* 0.21*** -0.26 0.17* 0.21 
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(1.70) (1.76) (2.88) (-2.19) (1.90) 
 
 
One - all male 0.0008 -0.17*** -0.31*** 0.13*** 0.14* 0.36 
  
(0.41) (-2.72) (-3.11) (2.81) (1.79) 
 
 
Many - all male -0.0035 -0.33*** -0.52*** 0.39*** -0.03 0.44 
  
(-1.18) (-2.83) (-4.56) (2.95) -(0.35) 
 Table 4 
Returns on firms within industries 
 
This table provides results for value-weighted portfolios formed within each of ten industries. 
Female denotes portfolios of firms with at least one female board member, All male denotes 
portfolios of firms with no female board members, Long/short is a portfolio long in Female and short 
in All Male. Alpha is the alpha coefficient from the regression model. Market, SMB, HML and UMD 
the market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors respectively. Newey-West HAC adjusted t 
statistics are in parentheses. The sample period is January 2004 to September 2011. ***,**,* denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Alpha Market SMB HML UMD Adj R2 
 
Female 0.0097*** 1.09*** 0.07 -0.49*** 0.25** 0.68 
  
(3.32) (12.79) (0.47) (-4.29) (2.49) 
 Basic Materials All Male 0.0025 0.93*** 0.37*** -0.05 0.02 0.75 
  
(0.99) (10.36) (2.75) (-0.74) (0.23) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0072* 0.17 -0.30 -0.45*** 0.24* 0.15 
  
(1.73) (1.21) (-1.30) (-3.04) (1.78) 
 
 
Female 0.0412*** 3.31*** 0.15 -0.79 0.61 0.51 
  
(2.85) (8.11) (0.27) (-1.57) (1.26) 
 Consumer Goods All Male 0.0064 1.31*** 0.54* 0.33 0.07 0.35 
  
(0.75) (4.62) (1.75) (1.08) (0.37) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0347* 2.01*** -0.39 -1.12* 0.54 0.19 
  
(1.93) (4.7) (-0.51) (-1.88) (0.98) 
 
 
Female -0.0034** 0.52*** 0.07* 0.07** -0.06 0.73 
  
(-2.49) (11.88) (1.67) (2.01) (-1.08) 
 Consumer Services All Male -0.0056*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.25*** -0.02 0.67 
  
(-3.32) (5.58) (2.96) (4.14) (-0.34) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0022 0.04 -0.32** -0.19** -0.05 0.16 
  
(0.96) (0.50) (-2.23) (-2.51) (-0.58) 
 
 
Female 0.0019 0.69*** -0.08 0.14*** -0.07 0.77 
  
(1.59) (12.87) (-1.45) (2.76) (-1.55) 
 Financials All Male -0.0018 2.3*** 0.88*** -0.65 -0.79*** 0.66 
  
(-0.23) (5.50) (3.46) (-1.37) (-4.68) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0037 -1.61*** -0.96*** 0.80 0.72*** 0.52 
  
(0.46) (-3.61) (-3.39) (1.54) (3.85) 
 
 
Female 0.0156 4.45*** -0.8 1.78*** -0.16 0.73 
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(1.17) 9.76) (-1.38) (4.10) (-0.39) 
 Healthcare All Male 0.0155 1.90*** 0.25 -1.96*** -0.86* 0.44 
  
(1.34) (5.63) (0.97) (-3.25) (-1.81) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0001 2.55*** -1.05* 3.74*** 0.71 0.47 
  
(0.01) (3.93) (-1.75) (4.03) (0.96) 
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Table 4 continued 
 
  Alpha Market SMB HML UMD Adj R2 
 
Female 0.0286*** 3.16*** -0.67** 1.21*** -0.04 0.62 
  
(2.76) (10.52) (-2.31) (3.47) (-0.11) 
 Industrials All Male 0.0087* 0.68*** -0.05 -0.07 0.10 0.25 
  
(1.94) (5.23) (-0.41) (-0.65) (0.88) 
 
 
Long/short 0.0199 2.48*** -0.62* 1.28*** -0.14 0.48 
  
(1.62) (7.06) (-1.85) (3.58) (-0.34) 
 
 
Female -0.0023 0.45*** 0.15 0.01 -0.10* 0.46 
  
(-0.9) (5.78) (1.38) (0.14) (-1.81) 
 Oil & Gas All Male 0.0059 0.58*** 0.28 -0.30 0.10 0.17 
  
(1.05) (3.16) (1.43) (-1.57) (0.66) 
 
 
Long/short -0.0082 -0.13 -0.13 0.31 -0.21 0.01 
  
(-1.3) (-0.61) (-0.52) (1.37) (-1.33) 
 
 
Female 0.1545 9.65*** -5.66 2.11 -8.85*** 0.12 
  
(1.34) (2.89) (-1.52) (0.84) (-3.12) 
 Technology All Male 0.1375 10.81** 2.16 2.12 -0.96 0.13 
  
(0.93) (2.08) (0.66) (0.74) (-0.34) 
 
 
Long/short -0.0168 -1.45 -7.65 -0.24 -7.54* -0.01 
  
(-0.08) (-0.21) (-1.56) (-0.06) (-1.77) 
 
 
Female -0.0047*** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0 0.14 
  
(-26.41) (2.15) (1.73) (1.75) (0.88) 
 Telecommunications All Male 0.0611 4.22*** 1.63 -2.41* 1.29 0.18 
  
(1.20) (3.24) (1.15) (-1.99) (1.54) 
 
 
Long/short -0.0657 -4.22*** -1.63 2.42* -1.29 0.18 
  
(-1.29) (-3.23) (-1.15) (1.99) (-1.53) 
 
 
Female 0.0015 0.8** 0.14 -0.47 0.07 0.07 
  
(0.15) (2.44) (0.21) (-1.27) (0.15) 
 Utilities All Male 0.0021 0.36*** 0.26* 0.03 -0.11 0.20 
  
(0.47) (3.58) (1.75) (0.28) (-1.13) 
 
 
Long/short -0.0006 0.44 -0.12 -0.50 0.18 -0.00 
  
(-0.05) (1.18) (-0.17) (-1.24) (0.38) 
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i Australian Securities Exchange, 2010, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 
2010 amendments. Available at  
http://www.asxgroup.com.au/media/PDFs/cg_principles_recommendations_with_2010_amendmen
ts.pdf – date accessed 16 November 2012. 
ii Ibid; Financial Reporting Council (2012), The U.K. Corporate Governance Code. Available 
at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-ffa99899e154/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx – date accessed 19 November 2012. 
iii Australian Human Rights Commission, (2010) Gender Equality Blueprint 2010. Available at 
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sex_discrimination/publication/blueprint/ – date accessed 16 
November 2012. 
iv   The AICD reports that in 2007 and 2008, the new appointments to boards who were 
female comprised 8% of appointments. In 2009,  5%, 2010, 25%,  2011, 28% and in 2012 it 
was 24%. The sample population reported by the AICD comprises the S&P/ASX 200 (top 
200 listed Australian companies). Our sample comprises the S&P/ASX 300. (See 
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Governance-and-Director-
Issues/Board-Diversity/Statistics - date accessed 14 March 2013.) 
v http://ir.wesfarmers.com.au/phoenix.zhtml?c=144042&p=irol-reportsannual – date accessed 
19 November 2012. 
vi Although the studies are recent, the datasets are from the prior decade. 
vii Note both of these studies measure diversity as gender and ethnicity.  
viii The authors define ROE as the ratio of profit after interest and tax to book value of equity, 
whereas shareholder return is the number of shares times the share price. 
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ix http://www.asx.com.au/asx/statistics/announcements.do – date accessed 13 December 
2012. 
x http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/index.html#interest_rates – date accessed 12 June 
2012. 
xi Panel A of Table 1 clearly demonstrates that it is not possible to disaggregate further on the 
number of women, since the vast majority of boards have only one or two women. 
xii Note that the Brammer et al. (2007) study is based on a U.K. sample.  
xiii For robustness we also investigate the period prior to the ASX recommendations. As 
discussions about this recommendation were already occurring in early 2009, we investigate 
the sample prior to 2008. We rerun all regressions using the sample period January 2004 to 
December 2008. Results (not displayed, available upon request) are qualitatively identical. 
Alphas on the long/short portfolios are insignificant and firms that have women on their 
boards are larger, value firms but do not load onto momentum. 
xiv We rerun the analysis using the period January 2004 to December 2008. Alphas on the 
long/short portfolios are uniformly insignificant. We do not find the size effect in the value-
weighted long/short portfolio but still find a significant value effect. 
xv Other results available upon request. 
xvi The alphas on the long/short consumer goods portfolios are significantly positive across all 
models although the alpha on basic materials is not significant in other specifications. The 
equally-weighted alphas on consumer services (telecommunications) are significantly 
negative (positive) across the equally-weighted portfolios. However, given that this result is 
not upheld in the value-weighted models, this may be attributable to some poorly (over-) 
performing small firms in that sector. 
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xvii Coefficients on the size factors are similarly predominantly negative on the equally-
weighted portfolios. 
xviii Results for the January 2004 to December 2008 are similar with most industries having 
insignificant alphas on the long/short portfolios. However, we do find outperformance in 
financials and healthcare and underperformance in industrials. Coefficients on SMB are 
negative in the majority of the cases. 
xix Both the all-male and the female consumer goods portfolios have a minimum of four firms 
in a particular month.  
xx We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
xxi Adams et al. (2011) use government data from the Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Agency to predict that high participation rates in the workforce may affect 
diversity, so that finance has a high workplace participation, whereas the natural resources 
sector is male-dominated. 
 
